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We advance an account that grounds cognition, specifically decision-making,
in an activity all organisms as autonomous systems must perform to keep
themselves viable—controlling their production mechanisms. Production
mechanisms, as we characterize them, perform activities such as procuring
resources from their environment, putting these resources to use to construct
and repair the organism’s body and moving through the environment.
Given the variable nature of the environment and the continual degradation
of the organism, these production mechanisms must be regulated by control
mechanisms that select when a production is required and how it should be
carried out. To operate on production mechanisms, control mechanisms
need to procure information through measurement processes and evaluate
possible actions. They are making decisions. In all organisms, these decisions
are made by multiple different control mechanisms that are organized not
hierarchically but heterarchically. In many cases, they employ internal
models of features of the environment with which the organism must deal.
Cognition, in the form of decision-making, is thus fundamental to living
systems which must control their production mechanisms.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: conceptual tools
and the view from the single cell’.1. Introduction
The term cognition applies to diverse phenomena that figure in adaptive inter-
actions between biological organisms and their environments. There is no
agreement on whether and how it is possible to trace the boundaries between
cognitive and non-cognitive (biological only) activities of biological systems.
Are unicellular systems that are capable of chemotaxis, communication,
vision already ‘cognitive’ [1]? Or is a nervous system required, with the conse-
quence that cognition is only found in animals [2]? Or is it restricted to
organisms with a neocortex, or even to humans [3]? How one answers these
questions has implications ranging from how one characterizes the core mech-
anisms involved in cognition and the relationship (hierarchical or heterarchical)
between them, to how one selects model organisms for studying cognition.
This paper joins the debate on the side that cognition is a fundamental
activity in all living organisms; Jennings [4] and Washburn [5] were early advo-
cates for adopting an inclusive view of cognition, defended more recently by
Maturana & Varela [6] and Lyon [7], and adopted by many of the papers in
this theme issue. Our particular contribution focuses on one cognitive activity,
decision-making, which we argue is performed by the control processes that are
required for organisms to be autonomous. All living organisms are autonomous
in that they belong to lineages of organisms that maintain themselves as dis-
tinct, organized systems far from equilibrium with their environment despite
natural processes that would lead to their degradation [8]. To do so, they
must procure matter and energy from their environment and use these to con-




2repair using a variety of mechanisms that perform physio-
logical and behavioural activities. These basic mechanisms,
which we refer to as production mechanisms [9,10], extract
and use energy, break down and synthesize materials,
move organisms through space, enable division or replication
of the organism, etc. The successful operation of these mech-
anisms is required since otherwise the organism would not
be able to maintain its identity distinct from its environment.
However, most organisms encounter variable environments,
both internally and externally. Accordingly, organisms must
adjust the operation of their production mechanisms so that
they perform operations needed to maintain the organism
at that time. They require control mechanisms that regulate
the operation of production mechanisms and make decisions
about when to use production mechanisms [9,10]1.
Keijzer [12], adopting a ‘radical embodied view’ on cogni-
tion, challenges the claim that making decisions is sufficient
for cognition; he maintains that full-bodied biological
agency, generating actions in the world, is required. While
we agree with Keijzer in situating cognition within agents,
we maintain that what makes activity cognitive is what the
agent contributes. In decision-making, the agent selects
which production mechanisms to deploy based on applying
norms to measurements.
To begin, we offer a very simple example to illustrate the
basics of our account of decision-making in the context of a
biological autonomous system, focusing on just one com-
ponent—an allosteric enzyme. An allosteric enzyme has
two binding sites: a sensory site at which binding a molecule
alters the enzyme’s conformation and an effector site that is a
production mechanism that catalyses a reaction. On our view,
the allosteric enzyme makes a decision as it selects, based on
the interaction with a molecule at the sensory site, how the
effector site functions. This decision determines the rate of
the reaction. Moreover, the allosteric enzyme does so in
accord with a norm that is realized in the constitution of
the allosteric enzyme itself. This norm is not something rep-
resented or selected by the enzyme itself, but incorporated
into it. The reason to identify the constitution of the allosteric
enzyme as embodying a norm is that it determines how the
enzyme will act. Moreover, calling it a norm is not just a
gloss offered by a theorist—it is established in the enzyme
by the organism. Like all mechanisms in an organism, an
allosteric enzyme is dependent on the organism for its con-
struction and repair, and for providing it with the matter
and energy it needs to perform its activities. In turn, by its
control operations, an allosteric enzyme contributes to the
maintenance of the biological system that harbours it. The
control mechanism is not an external imposition on the pro-
duction mechanism, but an integral part of the organism
itself. Through its actions it is making decisions for the organ-
ism. Selecting the kinetics of a reaction is a minimal example
of making a decision; below we develop examples where the
selection is between different production mechanisms. But
this example suffices to illustrate our characterizations of
decisions as requiring making measurements and applying
norms to make selections.
As the framework of production and control mechanisms
is fundamental to the account that we are advancing for
understanding cognition, we develop it further in §2. In §3,
we analyse some biological examples of production and con-
trol mechanisms, and in §4, we focus on how control
mechanisms are involved in cognitive activities such asdecision-making. In §5, we turn to what is an important fea-
ture of control mechanisms in living organisms, how they are
organized.
In both machines and human institutions, control mech-
anisms are often organized hierarchically [13,14]. In a
hierarchy, individual control mechanisms are themselves con-
trolled by a higher-level control mechanism, with a single
controller ultimately in charge. The system is organized as
a pyramid. In living systems, however, control mechanisms
are typically organized heterarchically. We use the term heter-
archy, first introduced by McCulloch [15], for major
deviations from hierarchy such as when a given production
mechanism is regulated by multiple control mechanisms
without these control mechanisms being themselves sub-
sumed under a higher-level controller. To the degree one
can distinguish levels of control, there may be more control-
lers at higher levels than at lower levels [9]. As we construe
these control mechanisms as effecting decisions, on our
account decision-making is highly distributed and
heterarchical.
Throughout we will illustrate decision-making in bacteria
and other organisms in which norms embodied in a decision-
making mechanism are applied directly to measurements
made by the control mechanism. But a more complex form
of decision-making arises when organisms rely on internal
models of the world (the concept of internal model is devel-
oped in control theory, especially as applied to neural control
of motor activity; see [16–18]). This may seem to go far
beyond the capacities of bacteria, but in §6 we discuss how
some species of cyanobacteria rely on an internal represen-
tation of the light–dark cycle (a circadian clock) to regulate
a host of activities. In a brief conclusion, we draw out the les-
sons that are learned by understanding decision-making in
the context of control mechanism and so grounding cognition
in an important demand placed on all organisms.
2. Production and control mechanisms
To explain a phenomenon, biologists typically advance an
account of the responsible mechanism. The new mechanists
in philosophy of science have focused on this practice and
offered accounts of what mechanisms are [19–21] and how
they are discovered [22,23]. On these accounts, mechanisms
generate phenomena as a result of the coordinated activities
performed by their constituent parts—individual parts per-
form activities that generate conditions for other parts to
perform their operations. These accounts have not distin-
guished between mechanisms that produce materials or
activities of the organism and those that exercise control
over other mechanisms.
An alternative framing of what a mechanism is will be
useful for distinguishing production and control mechanisms
and understanding the role of control mechanisms in cogni-
tive phenomena such as decision-making: mechanisms are
systems of constraints that restrict the flow of free energy to perform
work [24]. This is illustrated in a steam engine: steam is con-
strained to flow and apply force to the components of
attached machines. The notion of constraint derives from
classical mechanics [25], which confronted the challenge of
explaining the behaviour of macroscale objects in terms of
Newton’s force laws. Constraints stand in an asymmetrical
relationship to dynamics as they impose boundary conditions




3of particles in any of six degrees of freedom. Constraints
restrict what movements are possible. However, as Hooker
[26] makes clear, constraints also open up possibilities—
water constrained by a pipe can reach a destination much
further away than if it is not so constrained.
Biological systems rely for their activities on constraints they
produce. To maintain themselves as organized systems in
far from equilibrium conditions—i.e. in highly improbable
dynamic distributions of molecules and supramolecular
structures—organisms need to recruit and exploit the thermo-
dynamic flow by means of structures that act as constraints,
i.e. as local boundary conditions that enable specific processes
which can be used to perform some coherent activity in the con-
text of the system [27,28]. The constraints are locally unaffected
by the processes they enable. An enzyme is an example inwhich
constraints lower the activation energy necessary for a reaction,
thereby catalysing the production of an otherwise improbable
product,while not being consumed in the reaction.At a different
scale, the vascular systemoperates similarly to pipes. It canalizes
the distribution of blood towards specific organs, which could
not be accomplished by diffusion alone. As a result of con-
straints, production mechanisms function to synthesize, repair
and replace components of the organism and generate its
basic activities and behaviours. What is distinctive of biological
organisms is that these constraints and the mechanisms they
constitute collectively contribute to maintaining the conditions
for continued existence, thus realizing a causal regime called
‘closure of constraints’ [29]. In this view, living systems are
autonomous; they maintain themselves and self-maintenance
is their ultimate norm.
To be effective in maintaining the organism, production
mechanisms must be controlled so that they operate when
and how they are needed, not whenever their start-up con-
ditions (i.e. energy requirements and presence of material
substrates) are met. Uncontrolled operation is impossible:
owing to energetic and spatial limits, cells simply cannot syn-
thesize all the possible proteins and other molecules at the
same time. Control must be exercised over biosynthetic pro-
cesses in order to produce the necessary components at
the right times and as needed given external and internal
conditions facing the organism. In addition, different subsys-
tems might present different ways of operating, and their
activities and rates need to be coordinated to avoid conflict
and to ensure their joint functional contribution to the
maintenance of the system.
Let us consider, for example, the different and competing
production mechanisms involved in the metabolism of glu-
cose and glycogen in mammals (glucose intake, glycolysis,
glycogenolysis, gluconeogenesis, glucose transport, etc.),
which need to be coordinated by hormones such as insulin
and glucagon released by the pancreas [30]. The problem of
avoiding conflict and coordinating production mechanisms
with competing requirements is common to all biological sys-
tems. This is also acknowledged as a major issue in the
debate on the origins of life [31,32], where one of the main
challenges is to understand specifically how metabolism,
membranes and genetic components could come together
and realize concerted operations [33].
To functionally modulate the operations of production
mechanisms, all biological systems rely on a specialized
class of constraints that realize the second-order mechanisms
that control production mechanisms in relation to specific
variations induced by both environmental perturbationsand the internal dynamics of the organism [9,11,27]. To be
controlled, production mechanisms must have flexible or
variable constraints. Such constraints do not permanently
reduce the degrees of freedom—as the flexible constraint is
changed, so are the degrees of freedom left open in the con-
trolled mechanisms. By operating on these flexible
constraints, control mechanisms enable the organism to act
on and change its own dynamical behaviour. Control mech-
anisms are also flexible insofar as they are sensitive to
specific features of their medium and change their state
accordingly. Allosteric enzymes, as we described above,
show how this is possible. The binding of a ligand to the
sensory site results in a conformation change, altering soft
constraints in the effector site and thereby its ability to cata-
lyse a reaction. The operations of a control mechanism in
turn can be modulated by other control mechanisms that
operate on flexible constraints in the first control mechanism.
Multiple control mechanisms can be assembled into an archi-
tecture capable of determining multiple different specific
responses as needed to maintain the complex biological
organization constituting an organism.3. Biological examples of control and production
mechanisms
To make this discussion concrete, we consider two biological
examples of production mechanisms in bacteria—protein
synthesis and motility with a flagellum. Protein synthesis
involves first the transcription of DNA into mRNA, then
the translation of mRNA into peptide chains, and finally
the folding of the peptide chains. Each step requires pro-
duction mechanisms. Transcription is constrained by the
enzyme RNA polymerase, which binds to the promoter
sequence on the DNA, separates the two strands, and pro-
duces a strand of mRNA by adding RNA nucleotides. After
the bonds between DNA and RNA molecules are broken,
the mRNA strand is further modified (e.g. polyadenylation,
capping and splicing) by other enzymes [34]. Translation of
mRNA into a peptide chain occurs at the ribosome, where
the mRNA strand provides a template. As the mRNA
moves through the ribosome, one codon at a time, it becomes
the target to which a tRNA molecule ferries a corresponding
amino acid. There the amino acid is added to the developing
polypeptide chain [34]. In the translation step, the ribosome,
the mRNA and the tRNA are constraints [35]. The structure
of the protein is then further constrained into a three-
dimensional structure by chaperone enzymes to achieve
functionality and contribute to the maintenance of the
system that produced it.
These production mechanisms—the DNA and RNA
polymerase, the mRNA, tRNA and ribosomes, and the cha-
perones, must be controlled so that the appropriate proteins
are produced when they are needed. This is accomplished
through, for example, repressor or activator proteins, control
mechanisms that bind to DNA. Repressors block the RNA
polymerase from gaining access to the promoter site of a
gene or an operon (a set of genes) unless an appropriate mol-
ecule binds to the sensory site, causing a conformation change
thatmakes the repressor no longer able to bind to the promoter
site, thereby allowing transcription to commence.
Our second example is bacterial chemotaxis. Bacteria such
as Escherichia coli use flagella to swim. Chemotaxis enables

























Figure 1. The Sensing and Motility modules involved in chemotaxis in E. coli.
p, phosphate; m, methyl group; B, CheB; R, CheR; W, CheW; Y, CheY; Z, CheZ;
CW, clockwise; CCW, counterclockwise. From Current Opinion in Microbiology,
Micali & Endres [42], Fig. 1, © 2016, reproduced with permission from Else-





them to control swimming in response to changing gradients
of metabolites or toxins in the environment [36–41]. In this
case, the production mechanism is the flagellum, a complex
molecular mechanism consisting of a filament rotated by a
motor (this is the Motility module shown on the right side
of figure 1) [43]. If the motors on the five to ten flagella of
an E. coli all rotate in a counterclockwise direction, the fila-
ments form a coherent structure that propels the bacterium
forward (running behaviour). If one or more motors rotates
clockwise, the filaments separate, generating no propulsion
and the bacterium tumbles. Normally, the motors switch
between the two directions, resulting in the bacterium
moving in one direction, tumbling, and then moving in
another random direction. By controlling the motors, the
bacterium is able to bias the switching—continuing counter-
clockwise rotation and movement in a given direction for a
longer period before switching, which is desirable when the
bacterium is climbing a metabolite gradient or moving
down a toxin gradient. FliM molecules at the base of the
motors are flexible constraints—when phosphorylated CheY
binds to FliM, a given motor rotates clockwise [44–46].
To decide how to move, bacteria use transmembrane
methyl-accepting chemotaxis proteins (MCPs) to measure
metabolite or toxin gradients [38,39,47]. E. coli has five
types of MCP, identified by the ligands to which they
enable responses—Tsr (to serine and repellents), Tar (to
aspartate and repellents), Tap (to dipeptides), Trg (to ribose
and galactose) and Aer (to oxygen). These are arranged in
arrays of three receptors. Ligands can bind to many different
binding sites on the portion of each MCP that extends into
the periplasm outside the cytoplasmic membrane but
within the outer membrane of the cell. When ligands bind
to the receptors, they induce a change in conformation that
is transmitted down the length of the protein to enable bind-
ing with a kinase that phosphorylates CheA. This activity in
the Sensing module (shown on the left side of figure 1) begins
a cascade that culminates in the phosphorylation of CheY in
the Motility module.
The Sensing module, as described so far, only detects the
concentration of metabolites or toxins, not whether it is
increasing or decreasing. To detect that, the MCPs adapt in
response to the previous concentration so that they measure
a change. This is accomplished by two other Che proteins:
CheR constitutively methylates the MCPs while CheB
demethylates them in response to the phosphorylation of
CheW [38,39]. The stronger the input signal is at a givenmoment, the more methylated the MCPs are at the next,
requiring a still stronger input to generate an output on the
next cycle.
The whole complex of receptors and Che proteins consti-
tutes the control mechanism responsible for modulating the
operation of the flagellum (the production mechanism).
This is an impressive mechanism that is highly adaptive. It
responds not only to gradients as concentrations vary over
five orders of magnitude, but also to the intracellular
energy status through the Aer receptor [48], and to the pres-
ence of other bacteria by altering the number of different
receptors [38]. The number of receptors of different types
also varies between individual bacteria, resulting in individ-
ual differences in making the decision to move forward or
tumble.2 This whole mechanism is situated in an organism
in which it serves, among other things, to create the conditions
for constructing both the production and control mechanisms
and to provide energy for their operations. These production
and control mechanisms are thus constituents of an
autonomous system.4. Control mechanisms and decision-making
Having introduced the distinction between production and
control mechanisms, we turn to the relation between control
mechanisms and the cognitive activity of decision-making.
Various theorists advance different criteria for attributing
cognition. The dominant strategy, as exemplified in the devel-
opment of both cognitive psychology and cognitive science,
has been to take human beings as the reference point and
to focus on distinctively human cognitive activities. In these
disciplines, humans serve as their own model organisms;
practitioners often explicitly reject the continuity of cognitive
phenomena across all domains of life. Lyon [7] characterized
this as the anthropogenic approach, which she contrasts with
a biogenic approach that has roots in theorists such as Matur-
ana [50]. This approach locates cognition in the demands that
organisms must meet in order to maintain and reproduce
themselves. Among those who embrace the biogenic
approach, there are differences regarding how far back in
phylogeny to identify cognition. Some, following Piaget
[51], Maturana [6,50] and von Foerster [52], among others,
identify cognition as an activity of all living organisms
[53,54]. This thesis, for which Heschl [55] coined the name
‘Life = Cognition Thesis’, maintains that the dimension of a
living organism interacting with its environment and modify-
ing itself internally without losing its identity coincides with
cognition [56,57]. Formulated in these terms, the thesis coun-
tenances all interactions between an organism and its
environment, fails to identify the mechanisms underlying
cognitive capabilities, and cannot distinguish cognition
from mere causal interactions between organisms and their
environments [58].
Some theorists are more restrictive, limiting cognition to
organisms with rich behavioural capabilities [59]. Moreno
et al. [60] contend that identifying cognition with life renders
cognition indistinguishable from purely biological processes,
making it difficult to understand the nature, function and the
evolutionary history of cognition as a specific phenomenon
with its own normative prescriptions. Barandiaran &
Moreno [2] insist that a nervous system is required to provide




5cognition to manifest its own normativity, distinct from the
metabolic norm of self-maintenance. A consequence of dis-
tinguishing cognition from the activities of all living
organisms is that these authors introduce a chasm between
cognition and self-maintenance. One cannot use organisms
without neurons such as plants, fungi and unicellular sys-
tems as model organisms that realize simpler, and therefore
more accessible, instances of cognition.
We embrace the view that cognitive activities are per-
formed by all living organisms. Yet we identify as activities
that may be considered cognitive in a minimal sense—or
necessary or relevant for grounding cognition—not all poss-
ible activities performed by or within an organism, but
only those activities resulting at least from the actions of con-
trol mechanisms. And we focus on what is distinctive about
these activities—they involve the exercise of control over
metabolic and agential activities. Norms, in this case, are
those that figure in control operations. To develop this per-
spective, we focus on one activity that is usually considered
as fundamentally cognitive—decision-making [61,62].
Decision-making occurs when, in the face of alternative
modes of operation, a system detects and integrates infor-
mation procured from multiple sources (measurement),
based on this information evaluates alternative modes of
operation and, depending on that evaluation, selects a mode
of operation. All present-day living beings have this capacity,
as illustrated in the previous section in the case of bacteria.
The need for decision-making is perhaps even more apparent
in eukaryotic and multicellular organisms. The specialization
of organelles in eukaryotes requires control mechanisms that
decide which organelles to operate at what rate [63,64] and
where they should be positioned, depending on the needs
of the cell [65]. A similar need for control and decisions
arises as different cells specialize in performing different
activities in multicellular organisms [66,67]. Neurons consti-
tute a specialized type of cell for integrating information
and determining which activities to perform, and in ver-
tebrates, specialized neural structures such as the basal
ganglia take on the function of regulating both motor
activities and other neural processing [68,69].
Situating decision-making in the framework of control
mechanisms allows us to identify its core features and to
underline the importance of studying it in simpler model
organisms. As we argued in §2, all organisms must control
and coordinate production mechanisms so that they function
in ways appropriate given the organism’s internal state and
environmental conditions. Control mechanisms enable
organisms to selectively modulate their own dynamics (pro-
duction mechanisms or other control mechanisms) according
to their own internal processes based on what they detect
about both their internal state and conditions in the environ-
ment. The response of the organism is not just a reflex as it
relies on the constraints currently realized in the control
mechanism but subject to adjustment, not on the production
mechanisms alone. Individual constraints determine how the
control mechanism categorizes sensory inputs from internal
and external conditions into ‘equivalence classes’ [70].
These constraints not only group inputs into equivalence
classes but evaluate them so as to select actions [58]. That
is, the constraints in the control mechanism embody norms
about what to do in response to an input that it has classified
into an equivalence class. Moreover, the constrains that con-
stitute the control mechanisms are not fixed. They are madeby the organism itself [71] and are subject to control activities
of other control mechanisms in the organism [29]. As a result,
the same first-order control mechanism may realize different
norms and make different decisions on different occasions.5. Heterarchical organization of decision-making
mechanisms
Given our characterization of an organism as embodying
multiple control mechanisms, each functioning as a
decision-making mechanism, an important question concerns
how these multiple control/decision-making mechanisms are
organized. Theorists often envisage multiple mechanisms as
organized hierarchically. Simon [72] argue that natural and
human-designed systems are (nearly) decomposable systems
in which components are combined into larger systems,
which are then combined into yet larger systems. This frame-
work, which applies to production mechanisms, is often
extended to control mechanisms. Humans organize many
social systems hierarchically: in both business and the mili-
tary, lower-level bosses or officers report to higher-level
ones, with a president or a general ultimately in charge.
The structure corresponds to a pyramid in which there are
multiple low-level controllers, few controllers at higher
levels and just one top-level controller (figure 2a) [73]. Strict
hierarchy is seldom realized in human social systems, as
different intermediate agents often operate on their own,
and management theorists have explored a variety of ‘post-
bureaucratic’ modes of social organization that often depart
dramatically from hierarchical organization [74,75].
The notion of hierarchy is even less applicable to control
mechanisms in living systems, where the pyramid is often
inverted—with multiple control mechanisms operating on the
same production mechanism. Each controller makes its own
decisions about the operation of the production mechanism.
This picture is iterated as control mechanisms operate on and
are operated on by multiple other control mechanisms.
Although Pattee [27,76] draws upon the framework of hierarch-
ical organization in analysing control in biology, in one
publication he adopts McCulloch’s [15] term heterarchical,
describing a heterarchical network as ‘a distributed causal net-
work that does not define an order relation or special
significance to particular local causal links’ [77, p. 220]. Win-
ning & Bechtel [9] describe how control contains a local
hierarchical component (the controller operates on the con-
trolled system), but that as one tries to move higher, the
hierarchy quickly givesway to a tangled heterarchy of indepen-
dently operating control mechanisms (as sketched in figure 2b).
Heterarchical organization of control networks in biologi-
cal system is not just an observation—it is what we should
expect. When humans try to establish hierarchical organiz-
ation in institutions such as business and the military, they
often design organizational charts that they then seek to
implement and enforce. Control mechanisms in living organ-
isms are not the product of such design; they have arisen
through evolutionary processes in which variants that
improve, or at least do not seriously diminish, the ability of
organisms to maintain themselves and leave offspring
become fixed as a result of selection or drift. In such an
evolutionary process, one should expect new control mechan-
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Figure 2. (a) A typical hierarchical arrangement of control mechanisms. (b) A heterarchical arrangement. Sensory inputs are represented by dotted arrows, control





Insight into the nature of this process can be gleaned from
the way in which designers often confront problems with
their machines or their computer code—they make changes,
known popularly as kluges or kludges [78], that are intended
specifically to solve the immediate problem. These often are
not elegant but are sufficient. Although sometimes treated
as shortcuts to proper design, kludges often represent
sound strategies; when one has an otherwise functioning
system, adding a kludge is less likely to result in serious fail-
ure than would developing a new design de novo. The art of
developing a kludge is to act locally and affect as few other
components as possible. This applies as well to evolution:
adding a limited control mechanism to enhance fitness
avoids seriously disrupting the existing set of mechanisms.
Marcus [79] argues that many features of human cognition,
often taken to be failures, represent kludges added to earlier
evolved nervous systems. Jacob [80] made much the same
point, referring to evolution as tinkering. Since there is no
emphasis on maintaining the hierarchy, tinkering, kludging
or piecemeal introduction of new control mechanisms is
more likely to result in heterarchical organizations.
Although new control mechanisms in living organisms
typically operate locally, there are instances of new control
mechanisms that do have broad effects on organisms. How
could they evolve? One context is when they provide
coordination between independently operating production
mechanisms. We offer three examples. The first is quorum
sensing in bacteria. There are activities in which bacteria
engage that only succeed when individuals coordinate their
behaviour. Quorum sensing provides a way for individual
bacteria to regulate their activities depending on the
number or state of other bacteria, whether of the same species
or of relevant other species, available nearby for collaborative
activities [81]. This involves individual bacteria synthesizing
and releasing a molecule, an autoinducer, into the environ-
ment and then regulating its own gene expression in
response to the concentration registered by its own receptors.
Schultz et al. [82] describe how Bacillus subtilis uses such an
assessment in making the decision between maintaining
competence and entering into sporulation. Conceptually
speaking, the basic mechanism involves two processes that
are already performed in many bacteria—synthesizing a mol-
ecule for release into the environment and measuring
concentrations of molecules in the environment. All that is
then needed is to couple these processes and to regulate the
expression of genes needed for the activity in response to
the measurement. Once such a mechanism is in place tocontrol the activities of individual bacteria, it can then be
used for multiple ends—for example, for pack hunting, rip-
pling behaviour and fruiting body formation in the case of
Mxyococcus xanthus [83,84].
An invertebrate example is the use of a network of neur-
ons to coordinate contractile tissues in the bell of cnidarians.
Drawing on Holland’s [85] characterization of this network as
a skin-brain, Keijzer et al. [86] advanced the skin-brain thesis
according to which a first role of neurons was to cause con-
tractile cells to contract together (e.g. in the bell, where
coordinated contraction enables swimming). The cnidarian
nerve net is the recipient of information from multiple
sources that it must integrate to make decisions about
motor behaviours [87]. As a third example, central pattern
generators (perhaps better called local pattern generators
since they are local to individual muscle systems) function
similarly to coordinate the contraction of muscles in most ani-
mals [88]. This pattern of using neural connections to
coordinate local systems is further illustrated in the nervous
system of vertebrates, in which neurons in the reticulospinal
system [89] and the mesencephalic locomotor region [90]
serve to coordinate the activity of multiple pattern generators,
enabling coordinated limb movement. Even in organisms
with a greatly expanded forebrain, which allows for the inte-
gration of vastly expanded sensory information in decisions
about actions, these local integratory systems themselves
make decisions required for action [91].
Phrased in terms of decision-making, what heterarchy
entails is that decision-making is highly distributed in living
organisms. Rather than a central system making all the
major decisions, leaving subordinate decision-makers only to
make decisions required in the course of implementation,
there are multiple decision-makers operating relatively inde-
pendently of each other. Integration often occurs at lower
levels, at which control mechanisms may receive conflicting
outputs from various decision-makers and have to integrate
them into one action. Cognitive science research has tended
to focus only on very high-level, explicit, decisions which
might be presented to a human participant in a controlled
experiment [92,93]. This ignores the substantial number of
decisions made within participants, including ones affecting
behaviour in the experimental circumstances as well as ones
made in the daily lives of the participants [69].
The heterarchical nature of control will be furthered illus-
trated in the next section, in which we focus on another
feature of decision-making—the reliance on internal models
of external phenomena. This is often thought to require a
r
7nervous system, but we will illustrate it with an example from
bacteria.oyalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:201907516. Basing decisions on an internal model of
environmental time
So far we have argued for viewing control mechanisms in a
wide range of organisms as making decisions and hence as
cognitive. As we noted above, some theorists, such as Baran-
diaran & Moreno [2], argue for withholding the language of
cognition from processes directly integrated with production
mechanisms. They argue that only when a control mechan-
ism uses neurons can it employ norms distinct from those
involved in metabolism and so count as cognitive. One way
neurons seem to allow for distinct norms is by enabling
organisms to develop internal models of the world and
acting to act on those. In this section, we show that even
this is possible without neurons by showing how cyanobac-
teria are able to internally model time in their environment
and use this to control their metabolic and other activities.
An important feature of the environment that affects most
organisms on Earth is the light–dark cycle. It determines
when plants and cyanobacteria can carry out photosynthesis
or when it is safe for mammals to move about in their
environment. For all organisms, periods of sunlight increase
risks of DNA damage due to UV exposure and to elevated
ambient temperature in which they must function. Coping
with this cycle was particularly important for cyanobacteria,
which evolved production mechanisms that enabled them to
procure energy through photosynthesis. Molecular oxygen, a
byproduct of photosynthesis, is toxic for many enzymes,
including nitrogenase, which the bacteria need to fix nitrogen
[94]. Some species of cyanobacteria solved this problem by
differentiating into specialized cell types, one of which
fixes nitrogen and the other of which performs photo-
synthesis [95]. These cells must then coordinate their
activities so that each can meet the needs of the other. As
first observed by Stal & Krumbein [96], other species of cya-
nobacteria segregate photosynthesis and nitrogen fixation in
time. After raising bacteria from the genus Oscillatoria on a
16 h L : 8 h D cycle, these researchers observed that nitrogen-
ase activity increased and photosynthesis ceased just before
the onset of darkness. The bacteria maintained this cycling
even when transferred to constant light.
Although Stal & Krumbein did not characterize this ability
as circadian, researchers studying both plants and animals had
much earlier demonstrated endogenously generated rhythms
of approximately 24 h and established that they regulated a
variety of behaviours such as folding of leaves in some species
of plants [97] and locomotion in animals [98]. Halberg [99]
coined the term circadian (circa, about + dies, day) for these
rhythms and researchers determined that they involved not
just an endogenously generated rhythm of about 24 h but
also a period that is not affected by ambient temperature
(temperature-compensated, unusual for chemical reactions)
and a phase that can be entrained to the light–dark cycle
[100]. Working with a freshwater cyanobacterium of the
genus Cyanothece, Grobbelaar et al. [101] established that the
switch between photosynthesis and nitrogen fixation met the
first criterion: if raised in constant light, the bacterium fixed
nitrogen at any time, but after being switched to a light–
dark cycle, it would confine nitrogen fixation to the darkphase even after it was switched back to continuous light. Sub-
sequently, Chen et al. [102] established that the rhythms were
temperature-compensated and entrainable by exposure to
dark or to a low temperature (0°C) pulse.
The ability of cyanobacteria and other organisms to main-
tain an internal model of the light–dark cycle of their
environment posed a challenge: what kind of mechanism
could track daily time? Ishiura et al. [103] identified three
genes (which they named kaiA, kaiB and kaiC after the Japanese
word kaiten, ‘turning of the heavens’) that were necessary for
circadian rhythms in the cyanobacterium Synechoccus elongatus.
Nakajima et al. [104] reported circadian rhythms in a prep-
aration involving just ATP and the three Kai proteins,
suggesting a cycle of phosphorylation and dephosphorylation.
Specifically, they proposed that two sites on KaiC—serine
residue 431 (S) and threonine 432 (T)—were phosphorylated
and then dephosphorylated every 24 h. Rust et al. [105] estab-
lished that these phosphorylations occur in a specific
sequence—T is the first site phosphorylated, followed by S,
and then T is the first site dephosphorylated, followed by S
(figure 3a). The four different phosphorylation states
corresponded to different times of day—U (both unphosphory-
lated) to early morning, T only to late afternoon, both T and S
to early evening, and S only to late night. To ensure that the
process proceeded in just one direction, Rust et al. [105] pro-
posed that KaiA promoted both the phosphorylation
operations and, once phosphorylated, KaiB would serve to
inhibit KaiA and allow KaiC to dephosphorylate itself. The
state of phosphorylation of KaiC therefore serves as an internal
model of time of day [107].
Over the following decade, a fuller understanding
emerged [108]. KaiC usually exists as a hexamer with two
domains (often represented, as in figure 3b, as a double dough-
nut). When KaiC is unphosphorylated, KaiA binds to the tails
that extend out from the CII domain (shown on the left side of
the cycle), altering the conformation of KaiC and allowing
phosphorylation. Phosphorylation further alters the confor-
mation, affecting the CI domain so that KaiB can now bind
[109]. As the conformation of KaiC changes, the tails to
which KaiA binds are withdrawn and KaiA binds instead
to KaiB (shown on the right side of the cycle).
For this mechanism to satisfy our account of a control
mechanism, two further requirements must be met. First, it
must actually track the light–dark cycles in its environment.
This requires some means by which the oscillator can be
entrained to that cycle. Since Synechococcus elongatus has no
photoreceptors, it uses proxies to detect the light–dark cycle.
For example, when the bacterium is engaged in photosyn-
thesis, quinones are in a reduced state. With darkness they
oxidize rapidly, bind to both CikA and KaiA, and cause
them to degrade [110]. By delaying phosphorylation of KaiC,
the metabolic state that results when photosynthesis ceases
with darkness acts to reset the clock. Second, the circadian
mechanism must act in some manner on the production mech-
anism of gene expression. When SasA is bound to KaiC, it
phosphorylates itself and transfers this phosphate to RpaA
(shown below the cycle in figure 3b) [108,111]. Phosphorylated
RpaA acts as a transcription factor, binding to approximately
100 Class 1 promoters, upregulating expression of approxi-
mately 170 genes (including kaiB and kaiC). Eight of these
genes are also transcription factors which upregulate yet
other genes. Phosphorylated RpaA also acts to downregulate






























Figure 3. (a) The sequence of phosphorylation states constituting the circadian clock in cyanobacteria. From [105]. Reprinted with permission from AAAS. (b) The





dislodges SasA, stopping the phosphorylation of RpaA. When
KaiA joins KaiB, CikA also binds to and dephosphorylates
RpaA. Together these actions remove the activation of Class
1 promoters and the repression of Class 2 promoters. With
repression removed, genes controlled by Class 2 promoters
begin to be transcribed.
Employing this mechanism S. elongatus is able to use an
internal model of the light–dark cycle in its environment to
make decisions about which genes to express [107]. It satisfies
the requirement of a control mechanism in acting on flexible
constraints in the mechanism of gene expression. Through the
entrainment process, the clock maintains a connection to the
day–night cycle in the environment, but this only indirectly
affects its decision-making, which is based locally on the
state of the clock itself. When the entrainment process is
inhibited, e.g. by keeping the bacteria in constant light, the
lineage of descendants maintains circadian gene expression
for two weeks (the longest period that was measured) [112].
One function for which neurons are often thought to be
required is to maintain internal models of the environment
when sensory cues are not available. They often do so,
but the cyanobacterial clock shows that this is not required;
the molecular mechanisms in the clock establish norms that
regulate the bacterium’s behaviour. Interestingly, although
neurons do play a role in animal circadian clocks, the core
mechanism is also an intracellular chemical process
[113,114]. This conforms to one of Sterling & Laughlin’s
[115] principles of neural design: compute intracellularly
and chemically whenever possible. Before leaving this
example, though, we should emphasize that circadian control
is only one of several control mechanisms that determine
gene expression. Gene expression is also controlled by a
host of other control mechanisms that adapt to such factors
as available nutrients and toxins. The circadian clock is just
one component in a heterarchy of decision-making processes.
7. Conclusion
By advancing an account of control mechanisms as operative
on production mechanisms in biological autonomous sys-
tems, we have shown that control mechanisms areorganized heterarchically and that they make decisions, an
activity commonly associated with cognition.
A major advantage of this account is the fact that control
mechanisms are ubiquitous in biological systems, thus radically
expanding the range ofmodel organisms inwhichwe can study
decision-making. In particular, it allows us to focus on relatively
simple organisms such as bacteria, which are potent models to
identify and analyse the core elements of a cognitive process
such as decision-making and the control mechanisms respon-
sible for it, in line with the general approach developed within
this theme issue and with a long tradition of research that
emphasizes the continuity between biological and cognitive
phenomena [1]. In the case of decision-making, the core
elements are: (1) selecting between alternatives based on
making measurements of both internal and external conditions
and (2) evaluating those by means of norms embodied in the
controlmechanism,which are ultimately rooted in themainten-
ance of the organism.Wehave illustrated these basic elements of
decision-making in bacteria, and showedhow theyapply also in
multicellular systems. On the basis of these examples, we have
argued that control mechanisms are organized heterarchically
and that even in minimal cases they can use internal models
of the world to make decisions.
The question of whether cognition coincides with life or, if
not, where it starts, might remain open to discussion. Bacteria
do not perform all the cognitive activities other organisms
perform. Some organisms make decisions in ways that go
beyond the capacities of bacteria, for example by projecting
possible outcomes of possible actions during evaluations.
This requires more complex control mechanisms than found
in bacteria and other relatively simple organisms. These
differences, however, do not undermine the importance of
such model organisms in identifying and characterizing the
distinctive features of control mechanisms and of their activity
of decision-making and, importantly, in understanding con-
trol in terms of heterarchy instead of hierarchy. Adopting
this theoretical framework developed from minimal cases
may be fruitful for understanding decision-making and the
architecture of control in parts of the nervous system of ver-
tebrates, such as the brainstem, hypothalamus and basal
ganglia, which do not realize a centralized or pyramidal
royalsociety
9architecture and which are part of a control network that
includes many other parts of the nervous system and of the
whole organism, exhibiting ways of operation that are similar
in significant ways to those we have identified in simpler
organisms [69,116].publishing.org/journal/rstbData accessibility. This article has no additional data.
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